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This paper argues that coalitions will tend to employ control mechanisms to facilitate 
the adoption of compromise policies only when the expected benefit of their use is 
high enough. When partners are already satisfied with logrolling policies 
(compartmentalized by jurisdiction) or when compromise is already attainable 
self-enforcingly, there are few incentives to use them. Conversely, when partners are 
interested in compromise policies but are unable to reach that outcome in 
equilibrium, then control mechanisms are likely to be implemented. The empirical 
evidence offered tends to support the two main hypotheses of this work: control 
mechanisms are less necessary when the tangentiality of partners‘ preferences is high 
and when they foresee frequent mutual interactions. However, that seems to work 
better for the allocation of watchdog junior ministers rather than for the writing of 
comprehensive policy agreements. 
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1  Introduction 
Coalition governments form between parties that share somewhat 
complementary interests and allocate portfolios accordingly. As long as an absolute 
complementarity exists, no problematic bargaining between partners should take 
place once in office. However, this is seldom the case: ―[...] while the parties that 
make up a coalition may have more or less compatible policy preferences, it is hardly 
ever the case that all of their policy preferences can be realized simultaneously‖ 
(Müller and Strom 2008: 166). 
This potential conflict generates a tension between the compromise decisions 
of the cabinet as a collective body and the individual decisions of its members.
‡
 In 
fact, both modes of cabinet governance coexist in real-world parliamentary 
democracies, as reflected in the dual doctrines of individual and collective ministerial 
responsibility. This is why in coalition politics we find a number of institutions that 
limit the policy discretion of individual parties in the jurisdictions they control and 
try to enforce compromise policies through mechanisms of various sorts. For 
example, junior ministers from one party may be placed to serve under ministers 
from another party, or several compromise clauses may be written in a detailed 
policy agreement. Yet not all coalition governments establish this kind of control 
mechanisms. There is considerable variation among them. 
In this paper I adopt a cost-benefit perspective and contend that the 
establishment of coalition control mechanisms should be expected when their 
potential benefit is high. More specifically, I argue that when partners are already 
satisfied with a logrolling outcome where policies are compartmentalized by area 
(i.e. a collection of parties‘ ideal points in the jurisdictions each one controls), then 
there are few incentives to invest in the design of control mechanisms. This is also 
the case when compromise policies may be already attainable self-enforcingly, 
without needing any additional device. On the contrary, when partners are interested 
in compromise policies but they are unable to reach that outcome in equilibrium, I 
argue that control mechanisms are needed and therefore their use will be more likely. 
                                                 
‡
 See, for instance, the debate between Warwick (1999a, b) and Laver and Shepsle (1999a, b) on 
getting the cabinet decision-making assumptions right. 
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To advance some findings, I observe that the tangentiality of partners‘ 
preference saliencies and their expected mutual interactions make the use of certain 
control mechanisms less likely. Conversely, coalitions will tend to use them when 
partners sufficiently care about each others‘ jurisdictions and they do not expect 
repeated interactions to automatically lead to compromise. I find that this is the case 
for the allocation of cross-partisan junior ministers, but only in part for the writing of 
policy comprehensive coalition agreements. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section 
reviews previous contributions made on the use of control mechanisms in coalition 
governments and calls attention to a gap to be further investigated. Section 3 presents 
the theoretical framework and hypotheses of the paper adopting a cost-benefit 
approach to understand when and why control mechanisms are more or less 
necessary or useful. Next, I describe the data and variables used in the empirical 
analyses, the results of which are offered and discussed in the fifth section. Finally, 
last section concludes and suggests possible paths for future research. 
 
2  Coalition Control Mechanisms: Agenda Ahead 
Several authors have addressed the question of how coalitions can make their 
individual members stick to the coalition compromise goals instead of serving their 
own party objectives (e.g. Strom 2000; Strom et al. 2003; Martin and Vanberg 2004; 
Thies 2001). Through the departments they run, parties in coalitions could potentially 
shirk and push the controlled policies to their own ideal point. Different mechanisms 
have been said to help keep this problem at bay by strengthening cabinet‘s 
centralized authority. But apart from largely descriptive accounts of which 
mechanisms coalitions use, previous literature has seldom dealt with the 
‗under-what-conditions‘ question. Only recently some authors have tried to develop 
causal stories behind the use of these mechanisms in coalition governments. 
The few efforts to answer this question have almost exclusively focused on the 
existent relationship between several mechanisms, both exogenous and endogenous 
to the specific government. For instance, Müller and Meyer (2010a) argue that 
control mechanisms complement each other and show that coalition parties that have 
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been able to write policy agreements also tend to establish coalition committees and 
vice versa. Likewise, an election rule and the use of coalition committees appear to 
go hand in hand. Finally, strong parliamentary committees seem to make coalitions‘ 
reliance on ex ante mechanisms more likely (e.g. coalition discipline) but ex post 
ones unlikely (e.g. watchdog junior ministers). 
Along similar lines, others have found that the strength of institutional devices 
like parliamentary committees (i.e. legislative scrutiny of executive proposals) 
provides an alternative to other control tools such as the allocation of cross-partisan 
junior ministers (Thies 2001; Kim and Löwenberg 2005). 
Thanks to these approaches we learn that having certain mechanisms make 
others more or less likely. Yet they keep silent about how the nature of different 
coalition governments impacts the likelihood of the choice of particular control 
mechanisms. Put differently, differences in the characteristics of coalition 
governments are seldom considered as explanatory variables. Nonetheless, the 
studies made by Müller and Strom (2008), Verzichelli (2008), and also to some 
extent by Müller and Meyer (2010a) are remarkable exceptions. 
The former present an attempt to identify the conditions under which written 
coalition agreements exist. They do that through an empirical analysis that take 
several clusters of independent variables, including cabinets‘ structural 
characteristics and preferences, countries‘ political institutions, bargaining 
environment, and critical events. Their study is however largely conditioned by the 
structure of the whole book, which studies different phenomena related to coalition 
governments (i.e. cabinet formation duration, type of cabinet formation, conflict 
management, cabinet termination and survival, or cabinet membership and electoral 
performance) using the same clusters of explanatory variables (Strom et al. 2008).
§
 
Hence, their intention is more of an exploratory nature rather than to undertake a test 
of theory-driven hypotheses. Verzichelli‘s (2008) work is similarly an empirical 
exercise mainly, as he studies the allocation of watchdog junior ministers in another 
chapter of the same book. 
                                                 
§
 Besides, their dependent variable is just the mere existence of a coalition agreement or not, 
whereas in this paper we concentrate on policy comprehensive coalition agreements. 
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Müller and Meyer (2010a) do not only study how different control mechanisms 
complement each other, but also consider a number of what they call environmental 
factors. They develop some intuitive arguments about how familiarity, parliamentary 
bargaining complexity and polarization, policy preference divergence, time, and the 
institutional environment may impact the use of control mechanisms and test them 
against the data. They find strong familiarity effects (coalitions tend to adopt control 
mechanisms used in prior multiparty cabinets) and a tendency of coalitions working 
under a complex bargaining scenario to turn towards written policy agreements and 
coalition discipline. Finally, the empirical results also show that cabinets‘ potential 
time in office affects coalition partners‘ willingness to work out a regime of mutual 
control and that the existence of additional veto players (i.e. strong presidents or 
second chambers) make parties in coalitions rely less on ex ante control mechanisms. 
But beyond these few efforts we still know fairly little about which specific 
coalition governments are more likely to install certain control mechanisms and why. 
It is certainly difficult to provide a comprehensive answer to this question, in part due 
to a lack of reliable information about the true nature of coalition negotiations. It is 
beyond the theoretical or empirical intention of the following pages to provide a 
critical analysis of the theories developed so far or to disentangle the whole range of 
reasons that may drive parties in coalitions to devise mechanisms of mutual control. 
Nonetheless, this work aims at offering a parsimonious contribution to the study of 
coalition governance by analysing the influence of certain conditions that, everything 
else the same, should be conducive to a greater use of control mechanisms in 
coalition governments. More concretely, the ‗under-what-conditions‘ question is first 
clearly stated, hypotheses are then derived from a cost-benefit theoretical approach, 
and finally empirically tested against the data. 
 
3  When and Why Use Them? A Cost-Benefit Approach 
So when and why will coalition partners choose to establish a certain toolkit of 
control mechanisms so as to keep tabs on each other?  The decision to invest in the 
design of the mentioned mechanisms could well be approached from a cost-benefit 
perspective. To make this kind of decisions, parties must incur several sorts of costs 
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which can in turn vary depending on a number of conditions (Kreps 1990). ―Setting 
up coalition governance mechanisms is therefore costly. Specifically, it entails 
transaction costs‖ (Müller and Strom 2008: 185). Strom and Müller (1999) explicitly 
conjecture that ―[c]omplex bargaining situations heighten transaction costs, and high 
transaction costs lead to the adoption of less comprehensive agreements‖. Or the 
other way around: they ―expect to see more complete agreements, and more elaborate 
institutions for their enforcement, the lower the relevant transaction costs‖. So one 
possible answer of the question entitling this section is that coalitions tend to use 
control mechanisms when the associated costs are lower. The why is here obvious: 
higher costs make the design more expensive. 
But the cost-benefit approach has another side. The benefit one. Keeping costs 
constant, the higher the potential benefit of installing a control mechanism, the more 
profitable it will be. Hence, the rationale goes, a given coalition will be more likely to 
establish these controls the more their expected benefit. Analyzing coalition 
agreements, Müller and Strom (2008: 160) put it this way: ―We also expect that the 
greater the need for coalition agreements, the more common and elaborate such 
agreements will be‖. Likewise, Müller and Meyer (2010a: 15) write that ―[c]oalitions 
are more likely to employ the control mechanisms outlined here if the potential gains 
are high‖. Yet how can we account for such a potential need or benefit?  
The first step is to think in counterfactual terms: What would have happened 
had the mechanisms been absent? This article claims that the potential benefit of 
coalition control mechanisms varies under different circumstances. Most importantly, 
I concentrate on the type of preferences of the partners sharing office, and also on 
how likely are their mutual interactions in subsequent government formations. 
 
3.1  The counterfactual: Preference tangentiality and repeated 
interactions 
According to Luebbert (1986), the preferences of coalition parties can be either 
convergent, divergent, or tangential. Convergence and divergence are in fact two 
sides of the same coin. The difference between the two is pretty obvious, namely, the 
extent to which partners hold conflicting views over a given issue. The ideal points of 
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cabinet members can be closer (i.e. convergent) or farther apart (i.e. divergent). 
However, holding convergence/divergence constant, tangentiality can in addition 
characterize the preferences of the members of a coalition government. Unlike the 
former, tangentiality has nothing to do with positions and ―is really a matter of the 
relative salience of issues to parties as coalition members‖. The interests of coalition 
partners are tangential when ―issues are of differing salience to different parties; one 
party may emphasize cultural issues but be relatively indifferent about economic 
issues, while a coalition partner may weight the issues in the opposite way‖ 
(Andeweg and Timmermans 2008: 276).
**
 In this paper I concentrate on this 
coalition governments‘ ideological characteristic. 
In Figure 1 we can see a spatial illustration of what we understand by 
tangentiality. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The two-dimensional ideal point of party A is ¡Error!, whereas for party B it 
is ¡Error!. In the lattice on the left the two policies X and Y are equally salient both 
for party A and B. This is represented by the perfectly circular indifference curves 
(solid black lines). In the graph on the right, though, parties do not care equally about 
both policies. For party A, dimension X is more salient, while party B cares more 
about dimension Y. The latter is represented with the solid black ellipses and it is 
what I refer to when talking about tangential preferences. Conversely, I will label the 
situation of the saliences in the left graph as overlapped preferences (the overlap area 
is larger). 
Let me now assume that these two parties, A and B, have formed a coalition 
government and allocated the two portfolios related to the policy jurisdictions X and 
Y. The former is given to party A and the latter to party B. If we simplify the 
situation a little, there are basically two policy packages that can be implemented. In 
one of them, party A will set policy X at its ideal point (X
A
), while party B will push 
policy Y to Y
B
. Alternatively, the implemented policies can be ¡Error!  on the 
contract curve, in the shaded compromise area. In the former, each partner lets the 
                                                 
**
 Emphasis added. 
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other set the policies it wants in the jurisdiction(s) it controls in exchange for being 
allowed to do the same in its own jurisdiction(s). This would be a compartmentalized 
cabinet, where the coalition makes policies not as a product of issue-by-issue 
compromises, but as a logroll of party ideal points (Thies 2001). Compromise 
policies, on the other hand, would be those in the shaded area. These policy 
combinations are preferred by partners since all points in the compromise area are 
closer to both parties‘ ideal points than the ‗logroll‘ or ‗compartmentalization‘ point 
is. 
In a situation of tangential preferences, though, ‗logrolling‘ is a simple way to 
resolve partners‘ ‗differences in emphasis‘ (De Winter 2002). In other words, the 
policy package ¡Error!  is very close to the best compromise point possible. 
However, when the situation is one where coalition members‘ preferences are not 
tangential, the implementation of policies ¡Error! would generate a more serious 
problem. The opportunity costs associated to such policy package would be higher 
given that some points in the compromise area would be much preferred by both 
partners. 
This article contends that preference tangentiality makes partners happy enough 
with the only credible and incentive-compatible policy package (Thies 2001) which 
―depends only on giving ministers the power to do what they expressly want to do. 
Any proposal promising that a minister with wideranging power over the relevant 
policy jurisdiction will act against expressed preferences is less credible‖ (Laver and 
Shepsle 1990: 874). That would make control mechanisms essentially useless, since 
the counterfactual of what would have happened in their absence is good enough. In 
other words, the potential benefit of these mechanisms would be low since, spatially, 
there is little to gain when the parties of a coalition government have tangential 
preferences. Applying control mechanisms in this situation would probably not be 
worth the effort. 
Therefore, control mechanisms would be potentially beneficial only when there 
exist compromise policy packages ¡Error! that are clearly better than the ‗logroll‘ 
point ¡Error!. That is, under a low tangentiality (high overlap) of their saliences. 
However, others have suggested that parties in coalition governments may behave 
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cooperatively and implement compromise policies even without control mechanisms 
provided that they anticipate repeated interactions in the future (Müller and Strom 
2008). This is well in line with the predictions of the literature on contract 
economics, which emphasizes parties‘ incentives to preserve their reputation to be 
credible in future interactions (e.g. Chen 2000; Stiglitz 2000; or Aghion et al. 2002). 
Hence, without needing any additional (control) mechanism, parties would be able to 
reach the point they prefer self-enforcingly, as long as they found it sufficiently likely 
to meet their partners repeatedly. Under such circumstances the potential usefulness 
of coalition control mechanisms would be practically unexistent, as the preferred 
outcome would be already achieved without having to pay the transaction costs of 
their establishment. 
Note that in this whole argument the self-enforcing policy equilibrium 
conducive to the choice of control mechanisms appears sequentially after the 
assumed allocation of portfolios between partners. Several empirical studies of 
coalition formation processes, though, have concluded that the division of portfolios 
among parties and the appointment of ministers takes place at the end of the cabinet 
formation process. Hence, the policy pertaining to the various jurisdictions is likely 
to be agreed according to either some form of compartmentalization or compromise 
prior to the actual allocation of ministerial portfolios, which is not exactly the 
sequence behind the theory above. 
Nonetheless, what the argument assumes is that the eventual allocation of 
portfolios is consistent with and endogenous to the type of preferences of the partners 
and to the resulting policy equilibrium, beyond the specific bargaining sequence. In 
fact, the empirical studies mentioned above also acknowledge that portfolio 
allocation may be anticipated by partners or informally dealt with during policy talks. 
The built-in assumption is actually that the allocation of portfolios will match the 
degree of preference tangentiality of the partners in office, who will get the portfolios 
on the policy dimensions that are more salient to them. This assumption finds support 
in Bäck et al. (2011), who demonstrate empirically that parties that claim more 
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intensely certain policy jurisdictions in their manifestos are more likely to receive the 




3.2  When are control mechanisms needed? Main hypotheses 
To recapitulate, three different scenarios emerge in terms of the potential 
benefit of control mechanisms in coalition governments. They are summarized in the 
diagram of Figure 2.
‡‡
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
In the first two situations control mechanisms are not necessary but for slightly 
different reasons. When parties sharing office have tangential preferences (i.e. they 
care about a concrete group of policy areas and not much about those controlled by 
their partners), then a fully labor-divided cabinet (i.e. compartmentalized) is itself 
optimal, as partners are content enough with the policies such a cabinet produces. 
And that is regardless of how they evaluate the likelihood of mutual interactions. 
Control mechanisms would therefore be useless as parties already like the 
‗uncontrolled‘ outcome. On the other hand, when partners‘ preferences overlap (i.e. 
they care enough about what happens in the jurisdictions controlled by the others in 
cabinet), the compromise deal is the one they prefer. However, they may still find no 
need to install control mechanisms if all partners value sufficiently the likelihood of 
mutual interactions. If so, a compromise cabinet would be in (a self-enforcing) 
equilibrium and thus the preferred outcome would be already reached without 
needing any investment in additional controls.
§§
 
                                                 
††
 I thank one of the reviewers for inviting to clarify the implicit assumption that is indeed behind 
the argument. 
‡‡
 The shaded boxes stand for the government-dependent conditions (or in other words, 
independent variables) that configure the different scenarios. 
§§
 In a similar vein, Müller and Strom (2008: 181-2) state that ―[p]arties have incentives to 
preserve their reputation so as to be credible in future negotiations. Moreover, party leaders will 
care about their cabinet members remaining faithful to the coalition agreement even when the 
latter are tempted to exploit their private information at the expense of their coalition partners. 
Party leaders may keep such behavior in check because they have to keep in mind the big picture 
and preserve their party‘s (and their own) reputation‖. 
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Yet there is a third scenario in which establishing control mechanisms may be 
necessary or potentially useful for coalition partners. When compromise is the 
preferred outcome (i.e. when partners have overlapping preferences), but their low 
valuation of repeated interactions makes compromise not to be in equilibrium, then 
coalition control mechanisms may be needed. It is precisely under the circumstances 
embodied in situation III (see Figure 3), when partners in coalition governments may 
find it worth the effort to keep tabs on each other through a series of control 
mechanisms. Thinking counterfactually, this is the only scenario in which if no 
further mechanisms were established, the self-enforcing outcome would be one 
disliked by the partners in office. 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
This argument provides a theoretical account about certain conditions under 
which ‗coalition architects‘ may find it cost-beneficial to place control mechanisms 
in the cabinet. We can hypothesize that keeping the costs (and everything else) 
constant, the more the potential benefit of a control mechanism, the more the 
incentives to install one. What I do in this paper is no more (no less) than checking to 
what extent there is an empirical correspondence between the situations in which 
coalition control mechanisms would be potentially useful or necessary, and their 
actual use. The first two related hypotheses are the following: 
Hypothesis 1: The more the tangentiality of coalition partners’ preferences, the 
less likely the establishment of coalition control mechanisms. 
Hypothesis 2: The more coalition partners value the possibility of repeated 
mutual interactions, the less likely the establishment of coalition control mechanisms. 
In fact, these two hypotheses are well in line with Müller and Strom‘s (2008: 
166) intuitions regarding written coalition agreements: 
Not every situation that allows coalitions to form may require a formal 
coalition agreement. In some cases, the preferences of the parties may be 
sufficiently well aligned that there is no need to negotiate a formal 
agreement. Alternatively, party leaders may behave cooperatively even 
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without such an agreement if they anticipate either repeat interactions in 
the same arena or other interactions in different arenas.
***
 
Notice also that there is a third hypothesis implicit in Figure 2‘s diagram. 
Regardless of the extent to which partners value the repetition of their interactions, 
control mechanisms are unnecessary if their preferences are sufficiently tangential 
(scenario I). In other words, the tangentiality of partners‘ preferences should only 
make a difference when partners‘ valuation of repeated mutual interactions is low 
enough. In that case, they will envisage mechanisms of mutual control when their 
preferences overlap (scenario III), but they will find no need to do so under 
preference tangentiality. The implicit interactive hypothesis is then obvious: 
Hypothesis 3: The more partners value the possibility of mutual interactions, 
the weaker the (negative) effect of preference tangentiality on the likelihood of 
establishing coalition control mechanisms. 
These hypotheses –and in fact the whole argument– obviously rely on the 
implicit assumption that control mechanisms do effectively make compromise 
policies more likely and contain potential deviations from cabinet members. Or at 
least, it requires parties to think they are effective. I will briefly reflect on the 
implications of that below, in the explanation of the dependent variables and 
discussion of the results. 
 
4  Data and Variables 
In order to test empirically the hypotheses posed above I use information 
coming from four different datasets. 
On the one hand, I relied on a dataset based on the joint work of numerous 
country experts offering extensive data on coalition governments of 17 West 
European countries (Müller and Strom 2000; Strom et al. 2003, 2008). It provides 
information on 424 cabinets, of which 260 are coalition governments, and covers the 




                                                 
***
 Emphasis added. 
†††
 For further details see Bergman et al. (2008). 
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The dependent variables of this paper come from this dataset. They are the 
Existence of a Comprehensive Policy Agreement in that coalition government (as 
coded by country experts), the Establishment of Cross-Partisan Junior Ministers, and 
the Share of Cross-Partisan Junior Ministers in that cabinet. 
Coalition agreements exhibit a great deal of variation, running all the way from 
very general informal understandings (gentlemen‘s agreements) to very detailed 
formal documents (contract-like written documents) (Müller and Strom 2008). 
Written agreements can also vary a lot in terms of size, contents, and 
comprehensiveness, with significant differences across time and across countries. 
Since I am substantively interested in the way coalitions try to reach policy 
compromises beyond a mere collection of parties‘ ideal points in the respective 
jurisdictions, I will here consider agreements based on a written comprehensive 
policy programme. Such documents are generally rather specific ‗contracts‘ that spell 
out exhaustively and in great detail to what extent participants commit themselves to 
a broad range of policy initiatives.
‡‡‡
 In fact, one critical choice that a coalition has to 
make at its outset is about how detailed a policy agreement, if any, should be (Müller 
and Strom 2008: 174, 182). Consequently, the first dependent variable takes value ‗1‘ 
when coalition partners fix their compromises in a written comprehensive policy 
agreement and ‗0‘ otherwise. 
Some have argued that these types of coalition agreements, even detailed ones, 
are little less than window dressing. As acknowledged by Müller and Strom (2008) 
and Müller and Meyer (2010b), none of these mechanisms is truly enforceable. There 
is no such thing as a third-party institution that unambiguously sanctions deviations 
from the contents of this ‗contract‘. Enforcing such contracts, therefore, may require 
parties to be interested in observing them in the first place. If so, written coalition 
agreements would not actually be control mechanisms. On the contrary, parties may 
only be interested in the formalization of a comprehensive agreement when they can 
be rather sure that the clauses will be observed when it comes the time to make 
                                                 
‡‡‡
 In the terminology of Royed (1996), such an agreement would contain more definite pledges 
relative to difficult and rhetorical ones. In Luebbert‘s (1986) terms, explicit compromises would 
dominate over implicit ones. 
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policies. If that is the case, then the expectations regarding the influence of the main 
independent variables on the writing of comprehensive policy agreements would not 
be those put forward in the hypotheses above. However, I stick by now to the 
consideration of coalition agreements as ‗effective‘ control mechanisms and leave for 
the discussion of the results a further assessment of this issue. 
The other two dependent variables refer to institutions that are thought to keep 
an eye on the actions undertaken by the other partners in their own ministries: the 
allocation of watchdogs (junior ministers) in the other partners‘ jurisdictions, both 
measured through a dichotomous variable (Establishment) and through the 
proportion of ministries containing junior ministers (Share). The latter is especially 
interesting as it can capture a much more nuanced cross-cabinet variation than the 
0-1 variable in which a single watchdog junior minister is sufficient to classify a 
given cabinet as having this type of governance mechanism.
§§§
 
Hence, as dependent variables I am concentrating on two specific control 
mechanisms, the writing of a comprehensive policy agreement and the establishment 
of junior ministers. These are clearly the two most studied institutions when 
academics have inquired about how coalitions manage the control of their bargains. 
Therefore, the combination of the two can provide a good overview of the control 
mechanisms that multiparty governments establish (e.g. Strom and Müller (1999), 
Müller and Strom (2008), Timmermans (2003, 2006), Timmermans and Andeweg 
(2000), or Moury (2011) for coalition agreements; and Thies (2001), Manow and 
Zorn (2004), Verzichelli (2008), or some chapters in Müller and Strom (2000) for 
junior ministers). 
Three independent (control) variables do also come from the aforementioned 
database. The first is the Maximum Possible Cabinet Duration at the time of 
formation –before the next scheduled election–.
****
 According to Müller and Strom 
                                                 
§§§
 I thank Thomas Meyer and Wolfgang C. Müller, from the Mannheim Centre for European 
Social Research (MZES, University of Mannheim), for making this share variable available to 
me, which was not directly obtainable from the public dataset. 
****
 This variable is originally measured in number of days but it has been transformed in month 
units here. However, in the transformation process, it has not lost its fine-graininess (i.e. 40 days 
= 1.33 months). 
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(2008: 192-3), the longer the time horizon of the current coalition, the higher the 
uncertainty to be faced, and therefore the more restrictive the inter-partners‘ control 
should be. Similarly, the higher the Cabinet Preference Range (Polarization), the 
more parties are expected to disagree about policy, and thus the more interested they 
will be in centralized mechanisms of policy commitment.
††††
 Finally, would-be 
partners present in some cases a joint pre-electoral declaration to signal their 
readiness to join in a future government with a common agenda. These documents 
can be easily amended or accompanied by further agreements after electors have 
casted their votes, possibly decreasing the costs of hammering out post-election 
control mechanisms. Hence, a dichotomous variable characterizes the existence or 
absence of a Preelectoral Agreement. 
As summarized above, other studies have focused on the effect of legislative 
institutions on the way parties in coalitions control each other. Kim and Löwenberg‘s 
(2005) account of oversight institutions –German parliamentary committees– as 
devices for the enforcement of coalition treaties is one good example. Likewise, 
Martin and Vanberg (2004, 2005) claimed that, in order to enforce the coalition 
bargain, parties make use of parliamentary institutions to scrutinize the proposals of 
their partners‘ ministers to which they have been forced to delegate important 
agenda-setting powers. Countries vary in this institutional aspect –and sometimes 
even within a country across time– making legislative review more or less costly. 
Then, the easier parties find it to control their partners‘ proposals through amendment 
procedures in parliament, the less necessary additional control mechanisms outside 
the legislative should be, and vice versa. 
I have trusted in two different variables to measure the strength of legislative 
oversight institutions. First, the presence of Permanent Committees as opposed to ad 
hoc ones. This is a dichotomous variable that takes the value ‗1‘ when there exist 
legislative review committees on a permanent basis, and ‗0‘ when they need to be 
                                                 
††††
 Although offered in the Strom-Müller-Bergman dataset, the information of this variable 
originally comes from the Comparative Manifestos Project (Budge et al. 2001) and indicates the 
maximal distance in terms of left-right positions between the government parties (in manifesto 
points). 
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called ad hoc or when this institution simply does not exist. Everything else the same, 
parliamentary review should be more costly in the latter situation than in the former 
(Strom et al. 2003). The specific data comes from Bergman et al. (2003). Secondly, I 
also incorporate the variable (legislative) Committees’ Power. It is an additive index 
that provides scores on their role, authority to rewrite, and timetable control, building 
on three variables coded by Döring (1995). Clearly, this variable is better than the 
first one as it offers a much more nuanced variability. However, it has the 
disadvantage of coming from a ‗snapshot‘ taken in 1989, although we can suspect 
that this kind of institutions seldom vary across time. Hence, I assigned the 
one-point-in-time value to the rest of the years for each country (just like Tsebelis 
(2007) or Müller and Meyer (2010a) do), but simultaneously kept the variable 
Permanent Committees for which we do have across-time information. 
All the above described variables have been said to affect the likelihood of 
coalition governments to resort to control mechanisms. They have been incorporated 
in the empirical tests as controls to try to isolate the effect of this paper‘s substantive 
explanatory variables: partners‘ preference tangentiality and valuation of mutual 
interactions. The process followed to operationalize them is explained in detail next. 
 
4.1  Partners’ preference tangentiality 
For the first main independent variable, we have to measure how much parties 
in coalition governments care about different policy dimensions. If the interests of 
different parties are very intense in the same areas, then their preferences will be 
overlapping. Put the other way around, when coalition partners care a lot about some 
policies, but not the same ones as their partners, then their tangentiality in saliency 
terms is high and the overlap low. That is, they will be hardly interested in what their 
partners do in their issues while being rather free to do what they want in their own 
ones without causing much uproar. 
Fortunately, this saliency approach to preference tangentiality (holding 
polarization constant) fits very well to one of the few data sources on parties‘ 
preferences varying across time: the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) data. 
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This project codified the content of different parties‘ documents by classifying each 
quasi-sentence in different categories (for details see Budge et al. (2001)). 
These categories are rather narrow. To make sense out of them I followed Bäck 
et al.‘s (2011) attachment of CMP categories to 13 policy jurisdictions with a greater 
theoretical substance. Each of these new groups contained the sum of scores in the 
more specific CMP categories, resulting in a party-specific overall score of saliency 
for each policy jurisdiction. To transform this measure into a government-specific 
one, I computed the cabinet standard deviation of these saliences for each jurisdiction 
and finally calculated the mean of them to have an overall measure of the degree of 
preference complementarity in the coalition cabinet. Clearly, taking the saliency 
approach, the higher the average standard deviation, the more tangential are partners‘ 
preferences (holding positions –not saliences– constant). The resulting variable is 
Preference Tangentiality. 
 
4.2  Partners’ valuation of mutual interactions 
The second substantive independent variable captures to what extent parties in 
coalition governments value the likelihood of mutual interactions. This valuation is 
no more than an intertemporal calculus that each partner in the coalition makes. In 
this calculus parties evaluate whether it is likely or not that their current partners need 
be partners again in subsequent government formations. According to the second 
hypothesis, the higher this expected likelihood, the more likely is the emergence of 
self-enforcing compromise, and thus the less needed are coalition control 
mechanisms. 
Obviously, there is no direct way to observe how parties evaluate such a 
probability and therefore we have to rely on proxies. The strategy followed in this 
paper is based on the actual composition of cabinets through time. For each member 
in the coalition I calculated the proportion of cabinets equal to the current cabinet out 
of the total number of cabinets in which the party participated during the studied 
period. To make it a government-specific value, I attributed each cabinet the one 
from the party with the lowest value, what gives the variable Likelihood of Partners’ 
Interactions (Min. Value). This measure is consistent with the theoretical approach as 
18 
compromise would not be observed if one single member of the coalition did not see 
their partners as frequent travel mates, which would push the behavior of the whole 
coalition toward a non-compromise scenario. 
This is certainly a rough approximation to the intertemporal calculus that the 
parties in a coalition office may have in mind. It basically measures the degree of 
familiarity between partners counting the frequency of cabinets in the whole period 
of analysis. As it will be discussed in the next section, the behaviour of this variable 
is not the expected one for the case of written coalition agreements, which might be 
attributed to substantive theoretical reasons but also to the characteristics of the 
measurement. 
The source for the operationalization of the two main independent variables 
comes, mainly, from the CMP data and the procedure in Bäck et al. (2011). The 
article has also used the ‗Parties, Governments and Legislatures Data Set‘ (Cusack et 
al. 2007), which compiles different sources of information in the same database. A 
couple of descriptive statistics of the variables Preference Tangentiality and 
Likelihood of Partners’ Interactions (Min. Value) are summarized, by country, in 
Table 1.  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
As we can see, both variables vary considerably both between and within 
countries. 
 
5  Empirical Analysis 
I use logistic regressions to explain the establishment of cross-partisan junior 
ministers and the writing of comprehensive policy agreements. To predict the share 
of ‗watchdog‘ junior ministers in the cabinet linear regression models are estimated. 
Results are displayed in Tables 2, 3, and 4. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
The first thing that stands out from the three tables is the systematic effect of 
preference tangentiality both for the allocation of cross-partisan junior ministers and 
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the writing of a policy comprehensive coalition agreement. In model (2) of both 
Tables 2 and 3 we see that the higher the tangentiality of preferences between the 
parties in office, the less need they find in placing junior ministers in the jurisdictions 
of their partners to monitor their actions. That is, when parties do not care much 
about the issues that are salient for the partners that share office with them, they have 
little incentive to worry about allocating junior ministers to serve under ministers 
with other partisan loyalties. Interpreted in the opposite direction, the more partners‘ 
preferences overlap, the more they tend to trust in junior ministers as tools for mutual 
control. That seems to work both for the dichotomy between allocating or not (Table 
2) and for the continuous share of junior ministers (Table 3): the coefficients of 
Preference Tangentiality have the expected negative sign and reach conventional 
levels of statistical significance. 
As for the writing of detailed policy commitments in a coalition agreement, the 
same mechanism appears to hold empirically (see Table 4). As hypothesized, 
coalition cabinets with a high preference tangentiality between partners are less likely 
to invest in the writing of a constraining policy agreement with clear clauses on what 
each party should do in the jurisdictions under its control. 
Unlike with the first hypothesis, the empirical support to the second one is only 
partial. For junior ministers, the effect of the variable Lik. of Partners’ Interact. (MV) 
works as expected (Tables 2 and 3). The more likely the repetition of the current 
government, the less likely the use of these sorts of control mechanisms. As argued in 
section 3, the rationale is that parties in cabinets expecting to meet frequently are 
more inclined to pursue compromise policies (which will pay off in the long-term 
through the formation of subsequent governments) instead of succumbing to the 
(short-term) temptation of deviating to the individual party‘s ideal point. That is, 
partners in ‗frequent‘ cabinets tend to take a more long-sighted view and play 
compromise more often, leading to the emergence of self-enforcing deals. The fact of 
being self-enforcing is precisely what makes external devices to enforce compromise 
unnecessary. That holds empirically both for the 0-1 establishment and for the share 
of watchdog junior ministers in the cabinet. 
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Yet in Table 4, the effect of the variable Lik. of Partners’ Interact. (MV) seems 
to run in the exact opposite direction. Coalitions likely to form repeatedly over time 
are precisely those more prone to write comprehensive agreements with detailed 
policy clauses. This empirical finding would be inconsistent with the expectation 
derived in the theoretical part. It seems to be the case that precisely those multiparty 
governments that would observe the compromise anyway are those that generally 
write their compromises on paper.  
Previous scholarly research has found that most of the policies agreed up front 
in the coalition ‗treaty‘ are finally implemented (e.g. Müller and Strom 2000; 
Timmermans 2003, 2006; or Timmermans and Moury 2006), or at least help in 
containing controversy and conflict by pre-cooking policies (Klingemann et al. 1994; 
Keman 2002; Timmermans 2003; Moury 2011). Similarly, Müller and Strom (2008: 
164-5) state that: ―[c]oalition agreements exist, and they are designed to cement deals 
that might otherwise come unstuck‖. But immediately add ―[a]s long as the coalition 
parties faithfully observe the agreement [...]‖. As Timmermans (2006: 272) puts it, 
―[t]he principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be observed) is noble, but it 
needs reciprocal control among coalition parties‖. Even if one partner detects the 
other is not being faithful to the deal, it will have no means other than political means 
to make the latter behave. So it appears that the fulfilment of the range of policy 
initiatives to which will-be partners commit on paper is endogenous to the coalition 
parties‘ self-interest. In other words, coalition agreements may only be observed 
provided that they are self-enforcing. 
The problem is that if it is in the best interest of parties to respect and enforce 
the deal (because of reputation, mutual interactions, etc.), then it was in their best 
interest to adopt compromise policies in the first place, regardless of the written 
agreement. And that makes coalition agreements lose sense as a control mechanism 
with a causal effect in keeping individual partners on compromise tracks. So, 
inductively, we could conjecture that formal coalition agreements are no more than 
written documents putting together what the multiparty cabinet expects to accomplish 
during their term in office rather than to overcome difficult situations of uncertainty, 
mistrust, opportunism, or preference divergence and make possible policies that 
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would not be implemented otherwise. Due to enforcement problems, coalition 
agreements could only be redundant in the sense that they would write on the stone 
what would be done regardless. In contrast, when self-enforcement compromise is 




Timmermans (2006: 268) identifies ―[…] two strategies in government 
formation situations of mistrust, uncertainty and policy conflict. One is to make 
commitments as detailed as possible; the other strategy is to forego clear 
commitments and keep policy options open‖. He argues that the second strategy will 
be chosen when parties discount future more. One way to understand this discount 
rate is the expected non-fulfilment of a detailed coalition treaty due to partners‘ low 
consideration for future mutual agreements. This would be consistent with what the 
above empirical analyses seem to suggest.
§§§§
 Nonetheless, the rough 
operationalization of the variable measuring partners‘ valuation of future interactions 
–which basically counts the frequency of cabinets in the whole period studied– 
should probably invite caution in taking this conjecture too far. Higher familiarity 
could for instance mean less need to write the coalition agreement but at the same 
time less costs and higher intertia to do so. At any rate, these interesting implications 
for the writing of comprehensive policy agreements do merit further inquiry. 
As for the interactive hypothesis of the paper, we can conclude that it works 
reasonably well too, although the empirical support is again partial. The (negative) 
                                                 
‡‡‡‡
 Alternatively, it may well be the case that those cabinets that did not trust in the observance of 
an agreement opt for other type of control mechanisms to push policies closer to the optimal 
compromise point. For instance, they could resort to ex post controls (e.g. junior ministers) while 
avoid committing to any specific policy agenda. 
§§§§
 Timmermans and Moury (2006) also offer anecdotal evidence in this direction. They detected 
that ―cabinets with an unusual or even unprecedented party combination, Dehaene I and Kok I, 
had a relatively brief coalition agreement containing a comparatively small proportion of precise 
intentions‖, with very clear examples such as the 1994 PVDA-VVD-D66 coalition in the 
Netherlands in which ―[t]he three parties negotiated a coalition agreement dealing with issues on 
which the Liberals and Social Democrats were furthest apart, but which did contain less details 
than could be expected given their new experience in office together‖. 
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effect of the tangentiality of partners‘ preferences on the appointment of watchdog 
junior ministers is weaker as the likelihood of repeated interactions increases. As 
suggested in the theoretical section, coalition cabinets where parties have tangential 
preferences are already happy with the self-enforcing decentralized outcome and 
have little incentive to enforce compromise policies that they do not like better; and 
that is regardless of how likely it is that they see their faces in other governments. By 
contrast, partners with overlapping preferences should be much more interested in 
achieving a compromise outcome. Such a compromise outcome would be already in 
a self-enforcing equilibrium if the likelihood of repetition was high enough, yet if it 
wasn‘t, control mechanisms such as junior ministers would be needed to enforce the 
compromise. Once more, though, that seems to work empirically for the allocation of 
cross-partisan junior ministers and not for the establishment of a written policy 
comprehensive agreement. 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 4 shows graphically how the predicted probabilities of appointing (at 
least one) cross-partisan junior minister(s) vary depending on how likely it is the 
repetition of partners‘ mutual interactions, for cabinets with different degrees of 
preference tangentiality. The predicted probabilities and 90% confidence intervals are 
generated for two groups of cabinets, one with highly tangential preferences (value of 
the ninth decile of the variable Preference Tangentiality, solid line) and the other 
with a low level of tangentiality (first decile, dash-dotted line).
*****
 The graph clearly 
shows that the difference between cabinets with preference tangentiality and overlap 
is largest when the probability of mutual interactions is lowest. Instead, if the latter is 
high, coalitions will not find it necessary to install such control mechanisms 
irrespective of the degree of preference tangentiality in cabinet. 
 
6  Conclusion and Outlook 
This paper has dealt with the understudied topic of the conditions under which 
coalition governments devise control mechanisms to ensure a centralized governance 
                                                 
*****
 Value in the 10th percentile of the ordered distribution of Preference Tangentiality equals 
2.24, while the one in the 90th is 6.86. 
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instead of a compartmentalized one. It is said that the former allows the adoption of 
compromise policies that make partners better-off, while the latter tends to produce 
suboptimal policies that simply reflect a collection of parties‘ ideal positions in their 
respective jurisdictions. The problem is that compromise policies are not always easy 
to obtain given the strong agenda powers that each party has in their portfolios. 
Control mechanisms, it has been contended, facilitate the achievement of such 
optimal policies and thus coalitions will in general be interested in working them out. 
It is the case, though, that some do and others do not. This work has argued that 
we should expect multiparty cabinets to install such mechanisms particularly under 
those circumstances that make them potentially necessary and beneficial. These 
favorable scenarios have been identified as those in which partners both i) have 
preferences that are not tangential and ii) do not value much mutual interactions. If 
the former condition is not met then control mechanisms are senseless because 
partners with a high preference tangentiality already like a compartmentalized or 
‗logroll‘ policy package, while if the latter is not, then they are unnecessary because 
compromise policies would be attained regardless. 
The emerging three hypotheses (including an interactive one) have then been 
tested against the data. Preference tangentiality has appeared as a strong determinant 
of the allocation of cross-partisan junior ministers as well as of the writing of 
comprehensive policy agreements. The more tangential they are, the less incentives 
parties have to install mechanisms of mutual control. However, the evidence for the 
likelihood of repeated interactions has been more ambiguous: the more partners 
expect to repeat in government, the less they need to place junior ministers in the 
jurisdictions controlled by the other partners, but also the more they tend to write 
detailed agreements. That might suggest that coalitions facing a high probability of 
compromise non-observance avoid committing to a comprehensive policy agenda 
and turn to incomplete contracts instead. Detailed coalition agreements might only be 
able to put on paper, redundantly, what would be done regardless. 
These findings and conjectures, and in particular the role of preference 
tangentiality on other phases of the coalition life cycle beyond the use of control 
mechanisms –such as formation, portfolio allocation, termination, and also 
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governance more broadly– does merit further attention. This paper has tried to 
provide both a theoretical and an empirical account of certain conditions that make 
the use of control mechanisms in coalitions more likely. In so doing, some questions 
have been answered and new ones have been opened. Future research is thus needed, 
and there is every reason to believe that such efforts will help improve our 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (MAIN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES) 
    
Country / Descriptive Preference Lik. Part. 
(Observations) Statistic Tangentiality Int. (MV) 
Austria Mean 4.06 0.61 
(13) St. Dev. 1.14 0.23 
Belgium Mean 3.79 0.22 
(27) St. Dev. 1.16 0.12 
Denmark Mean 4.15 0.18 
(16) St. Dev. 1.34 0.1 
Finland Mean 6.53 0.08 
(28) St. Dev. 1.62 0.04 
France Mean 3.34 0.14 
(17) St. Dev. 1.67 0.15 
Germany Mean 4.01 0.31 
(21) St. Dev. 1.23 0.17 
Greece Mean 3.37 0.20 
(2) St. Dev. 1.38 0.08 
Iceland Mean 3.92 0.26 
(18) St. Dev. 1.02 0.11 
Ireland Mean 4.29 0.24 
(10) St. Dev. 3.07 0.14 
Italy Mean 4.44 0.09 
(33) St. Dev. 1.22 0.17 
Luxembourg Mean 3.63 0.45 
(16) St. Dev. 1.54 0.18 
Netherlands Mean 2.62 0.16 
(22) St. Dev. 0.94 0.08 
Norway Mean 2.99 0.34 
(8) St. Dev. 0.43 0.06 
Portugal Mean 1.20 0.33 
(5) St. Dev. 1.68 0.14 
Sweden Mean 4.06 0.18 
(7) St. Dev. 1.00 0.07 
Total Mean 4.06 0.23 
(243) St. Dev. 1.74 0.19 




TABLE 2: LOGISTIC REGRESSION ESTIMATES (ESTABLISHMENT OF 
CROSS-PARTISAN JUNIOR MINISTERS) 
 
 
       
 
Robust Clust. Robust Clust. Robust Clust. 
 
S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E. 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
       
Max. Poss. Cabinet Duration 
0.020 0.028 0.029 
(0.010)** (0.012)* (0.011)*** (0.012)** (0.011)*** (0.012)** 
Cabinet Pref. Range (Polariz.) 
-0.003 0.009 0.010 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Preelectoral Agreement 
1.255 0.931 1.103 
(0.655)* (0.891) (0.691) (0.848) (0.710) (0.894) 
Permanent Committees 
-2.025 -2.150 -2.109 
(0.422)*** (1.179)* (0.542)*** (1.285)* (0.528)*** (1.232)* 
Committees' Power 
0.472 0.526 0.552 





(0.107)*** (0.164)*** (0.163)*** (0.230)*** 




(1.024)*** (1.673) (2.186)*** (3.195)** 
Pref. Tangentiality * Lik. Part. Int. (MV) 
    
0.981 
    
(0.528)* (0.579)* 
Constant 
-2.950 -1.364 -0.741 
(1.351)** (3.589) (1.364) (3.423) (1.363) (3.331) 
 
      Observations 244 243 243 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.112 0.198 0.208 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      
Standard errors in parentheses 
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TABLE 3: LINEAR REGRESSION ESTIMATES (SHARE OF 
CROSS-PARTISAN JUNIOR MINISTERS) 
 
 
       
 
Robust Clust. Robust Clust. Robust Clust. 
 
S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E. 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
       
Max. Poss. Cabinet Duration 
0.003 0.004 0.004 
(0.001)** (0.001)* (0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.001)** 
Cabinet Pref. Range (Polariz.) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Preelectoral Agreement 
0.051 0.048 0.077 
(0.073) (0.144) (0.071) (0.124) (0.074) (0.120) 
Permanent Committees 
-0.090 -0.116 -0.108 
(0.042)** (0.140) (0.043)*** (0.088) (0.044)** (0.083) 
Committees' Power 
0.020 0.028 0.030 





(0.011)*** (0.017)* (0.017)*** (0.017)*** 




(0.143)*** (0.227)** (0.266)*** (0.539)* 
Pref. Tangentiality * Lik. Part. Int. (MV) 
    
0.147 
    
(0.074)** (0.079)* 
Constant 
0.031 0.173 0.280 
(0.118) (0.325) (0.133) (0.314) (0.137)** (0.290) 
 
      Observations 242 241 241 
R
2
 0.030 0.145 0.165 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      
Standard errors in parentheses 
      
31 
TABLE 4: LOGISTIC REGRESSION ESTIMATES (EXISTENCE OF A 






       
 
Robust Clust. Robust Clust. Robust Clust. 
 
S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E. 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
       
Max. Poss. Cabinet Duration 
0.015 0.011 0.011 
(0.008)* (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Cabinet Pref. Range (Polariz.) 
-0.016 -0.006 -0.006 
(0.006)*** (0.006)** (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) 
Preelectoral Agreement 
-0.151 -0.572 -0.610 
(0.506) (0.969) (0.493) (0.846) (0.503) (0.844) 
Permanent Committees 
0.183 0.616 0.608 
(0.354) (0.641) (0.400) (0.731) (0.404) (0.747) 
Committees' Power 
0.030 -0.031 -0.034 





(0.101)** (0.127)* (0.141) (0.202) 




(0.791)** (1.392) (2.209) (3.132) 
Pref. Tangentiality * Lik. Part. Int. (MV) 
    
-0.186 
    
(0.555) (0.627) 
Constant 
-1.003 -0.356 -0.501 
(1.041) (2.732) (1.147) (3.004) (1.200) (3.119) 
 
      Observations 244 243 243 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.030 0.069 0.069 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      
Standard errors in parentheses 
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FIGURE 1: PORTFOLIO LATTICES AND TYPES OF PREFERENCES 










FIGURE 3: NECESSITY OF COALITION CONTROL MECHANISMS (MATRIX) 
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FIGURE 4: INTERACTIVE EFFECT ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF 
ESTABLISHING CROSS-PARTISAN JUNIOR MINISTERS 
 
 
 
 
